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Acquired / Case file

Ferrari

Scarcity as the entire business model, not the marketing layer.

Latest filing on file · 2025-12-31

Revenue
€7.1B
FY2025 · EUR
20-F · period ended 2025-12-31Source
Operating cash flow
€2.3B
FY2025 · EUR
20-F · period ended 2025-12-31Source
Capital expenditures
€485M
FY2025 · EUR
20-F · period ended 2025-12-31Source

Overview

Business model and origins

Build the road cars only to fund the racing programme — never the other way around.

1 episode1 hook2026-05 case file as of

The scarcity equation

Three brands in the same business — selling artificial scarcity to people who could afford an unconstrained alternative. The annual-unit gap between them is the entire story.

Ferrari

Flagship: F8 / SF90 production car

Annual units

14K

Avg price

$500K

Implied revenue

$7.0B

Wait time

3 yrs

Years operating

79

Source: Ferrari 2024 annual report (shipments) + Acquired episode "Ferrari" (Apr 2026, descriptionPreview) · 2026-04

Annual unit + price estimates are public-source rough orders of magnitude. The equation is supply × price = revenue, but the strategic point is that the wait time is the moat.

Origin

Enzo Ferrari ran Alfa Romeo's factory racing team in the 1930s before spinning out. The first Ferrari road car, the 125 S in 1947, existed to bankroll Scuderia Ferrari's Grand Prix campaign. Every commercial decision since has been measured against the racing programme — including the choices to leave revenue on the table by capping production.

Hooks from these episodes

Across its entire 79-year history, Ferrari has sold ~330,000 cars at an average price of $500,000. Hermès sells that many Birkins every two years; Rolex moves that many watches every three months.

Scarcity as the entire business model, not the marketing layer.